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In mathematical logic, the compactness theorem states that a set of first-order sentences has a model if and only if every finite subset of it has a model. This theorem is an important tool in model theory, as it provides a useful method for constructing models of any set of sentences that is finitely consistent. The compactness theorem for the propositional calculus is a consequence of Tychonoff's theorem (which says that the product of compact spaces is compact) applied to compact Stone spaces;〔See Truss (1997).〕 hence, the theorem's name. Likewise, it is analogous to the finite intersection property characterization of compactness in topological spaces: a collection of closed sets in a compact space has a non-empty intersection if every finite subcollection has a non-empty intersection. The compactness theorem is one of the two key properties, along with the downward Löwenheim–Skolem theorem, that is used in Lindström's theorem to characterize first-order logic. Although there are some generalizations of the compactness theorem to non-first-order logics, the compactness theorem itself does not hold in them. ==History== Kurt Gödel proved the countable compactness theorem in 1930. Anatoly Maltsev proved the uncountable case in 1936.〔Vaught, Robert L.: Alfred Tarski's work in model theory. J. Symbolic Logic 51 (1986), no. 4, 869–882〕 〔Robinson, A.: Non-standard analysis. North-Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam 1966. page 48.〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「compactness theorem」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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